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Abstract
4
 
We analyse the effects of the advertising ban on French public television, which came 
into effect on the 5th of January 2009. The ban forbids commercial advertising on 
public TV in the time slot 20.00-6.00. By using a difference-in-difference approach we 
show that advertising which was previously broadcasted on public TV in the time slot 
20.00-6.00 did not switch to private channels in the same time slot (nor did the price per 
second in that time slot on private channels rise). Rather advertising partly switched to 
public TV in the time slot 6.00-20.00. The trend away from aerial towards non-aerial 
TV channels continued but was not increased. The common expectation that the ban 
would favour private TV channels at the expense of public ones was therefore wrong. 
Interestingly, the relative audience of public to private TV did not tilt in favour of 
public TV. This suggests that advertising aversion is not the driving  parameter at work.  
More likely, for advertisers, viewers of public TV in the slot 6.00-20.00 are closer 
substitutes for viewers of public TV in the slot 20.00-6.00 than are viewers of private 
TV channels in the slot 20.00-6.00.  
 
JEL Classification: L82, D18, M7. 
Keywords: two-sided markets, media, advertising regulation,  television, public service 
broadcasting 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Whether public TV should be financed by licence fees and public transfers only or also 
by commercial advertising is a long lasting debate in many countries. Supporters of a 
public TV financed only by licence fees and public transfers claim that this would 
guarantee a higher quality of the programs by freeing public TV stations from the  
interests of advertisers. It would also allow public TV stations to pursue a different and 
nobler objective than audience maximization, as for instance education. Those against a 
ban on advertising on public TV claim on the contrary that the resulting loss in 
advertising revenues will lower the ability of public TV stations to invest in quality and 
thus lead to programs of lower quality. Moreover, a complete dependence on public 
funding would facilitate political control of media.  
Whereas the BBC is a well-known and successful example of a public TV financed only 
by licence fees and public transfers, whose quality is often taken as an example of 
success, in most other European countries commercial advertising revenues constitute a 
substantial part of the budget of public TVs. Another exception has however been 
Germany, where advertising on public TV after 20.00 has been forbidden since 1991.
5
 
We do not address here the debate of whether public TV should or should not be 
financed by advertising. First, addressing that question would require at least data on 
vertical and horizontal program differentiation. Second,  
We focus instead on the impact of a regulatory intervention banning ads on public TV 
on competition between TV stations, starting from a situation in which public TV was 
financing itself also through advertising and was therefore potentially competing with 
private commercial TV not only on the audience side but also on the advertising side of 
the market.  
Following the earlier German example, the French government decided to ban 
commercial advertisements on State controlled TV stations starting from January 5, 
                                                 
5
 The ban was confirmed also in 2010. See Rundfunkstaatsvertrag, 1991, and Rundfunkstaatsvertrag, 
2010. Note however that it is still allowed to sponsor programs broadcasted after 20h. Recently proposals 
have been put forward to ban also sponsoring after 20h on public TV stations except for sport events, and 
to ban advertising from public TV stations even before 20h.  
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2009. The ban initially applies to programs broadcasted between 20.00 and 6.00 and it 
was planned that it will be gradually extended to all broadcasting time.
6
  
The ban, announced by President Sarkozy in a press conference held on 8 January 2008, 
came completely as a surprise to both the French government and the management of 
French public TV
7
 and the general perception was that President Sarkozy was doing a 
favour to private TV channels at the expense of public ones. For example the Economist 
stated “the new plan was unexpectedly proposed by President Nicolas Sarkozy”. The 
Economist also raised the question of who would gain from the ban: “If the 
beneficiaries of the ban on advertising are not necessarily the viewers, who gains? 
Unsurprisingly, France's commercial channels are delighted at the prospect of extra ad 
revenue coming their way.” “TF1's biggest shareholder is Bouygues, a conglomerate, 
whose boss, Martin Bouygues, just happens to be a close friend of Mr Sarkozy's and 
godfather to one of his sons.” “Another bigwig who will benefit is Vincent Bolloré, a 
media magnate who launched a television channel, Direct 8, in 2005. Mr Sarkozy has 
borrowed Mr Bolloré's yacht and private jet for two holidays since his election last 
May.” “His opponents grumble that his new plan will mainly benefit his friends.” (all 
citations from The Economist, A fuzzy picture, February 21, 2008). 
The Guardian shared the Economist’s opinion by stating that “Sarkozy, who moves in a 
circle of wealthy television owners and press barons and counts "Télépresident" among 
his numerous nicknames, surprised even his own culture minister this week when he 
announced that adverts should be eliminated from France's five state TV stations”. 
According to the Guardian, “[s]crapping adverts from state TV would mean €800m 
(£600m) in advertising revenues immediately transferring to private stations” and “[t]he 
Socialist party fumed that the immediate beneficiaries of the shift in advertising would 
be Sarkozy's own media tycoon friends.” (all citations from The Guardian, Sarkozy to 
ban advertizing from state television, January 10, 2008). 
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 Ministère de la culture et de la communication, 2009 
7
 According to Le Monde Diplomatique (2008), the announcement of President Sarkozy was completely 
unexpected. Neither the prime minister Francois Fillon, Mrs Christine Albanel (ministre de l’audiovisuel 
public) nor Patrick de Carolis (president of France Télévisions) knew anything about this decision. 
According to the article only Henri Guaino (who apparently writes the TV speeches for Sarkozy) and 
Alain Minc (consultant of the industrialist Vincent Bolloré) were informed about Sarkozy’s plans. The 
last one is supposed to be involved in the development of Sarkozy’s plan. Also according to Le Canard 
enchaîné (2008) and The Economist (2008) the announcement of the advertising ban on public television 
was unexpected. According to the Guardian (2008) the announcement was unexpected and even the 
culture minister did not know anything about the plan. 
 4 
The current paper will use this “natural experiment” to estimate the impact of the 
regulatory change on the advertising and the audience market, by analysing how 
advertising quantity, price and revenues and the number of viewers have changed on 
both public and private TV channels. The first objective is to analyse the impact of such 
an advertising ban on competition between public and private TV channels. Since 
theoretically the impact of such a regulatory intervention is likely to depend on the 
features of competition in the market, the analysis is also likely to shed some light also 
on these features. As such it might provide some guidance on the most appropriate 
methods of financing the vanishing of advertising revenues for State-controlled 
channels. More generally, it might have policy implications for regulatory interventions 
on the media market which aim at setting limits to advertising concentration in a given 
media product (e.g. the EU Audiovisual Media services directive) or aim at defending 
pluralism by setting limits to concentration in the advertising market. 
The regulation of the maximum amount of advertising during television programming 
in the EU is decided by the European Commission through the Directive “Television 
without Frontiers”, implemented by each Member State. The Directive 8  imposes 
advertising floors of 12 minutes per hour and 3 hours per day.
9
 However, single 
Member States are free to adopt stricter rules. In this context, even before President 
Sarkozy’s decision, France had one of the most restrictive legislations in Europe. 
Probably in order to prepare the advertising ban on public TV stations, the decree 
approved on December 19
th
, 2008 and coming into force on the 1
st
 of January 2009, 
established the extension of the average daily length of advertising from 6 to 9 minutes 
per hour for the most important private channels TF1 and M6 (however, the rule 
regarded also cable, satellite and DTT stations).
10
 As of 1
st
 of January 2009, the average 
length of advertising decreased from 8 to 6 minutes per hour for the public television 
channels (France 2, France 3, France 5).
11
 Furthermore, the decree established the shift 
from the “glissante” to the “exact” hour as the reference to calculate the maximum 
advertising time permitted in an hour, which remained at 12 minutes.
12
 These new 
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 See http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/tvwf/index_en.htm 
9
 Ministère de la culture et de la communication, 2008 
10
 Légifrance, 2010 
11
 SNPTV, 2010 
12
 SNPTV, 2010 
 5 
constraints conformed to the new European Directive, “Audiovisual Media Services”13, 
which had partially modified the previous one. It abolished in particular the daily limit 
of 3 hours of advertising but kept the established hourly limit of 12 minutes for 
advertising and teleshopping spots.
14
 These hourly advertising caps  
As already mentioned above, the first step of the French reform consisted of banning 
commercial advertisements on public TV stations (France 2, France 3, France 4, France 
5 and others, all controlled by France Televisions) between 20pm and 6am starting from 
January 5
th
, 2009.
15
 The very same reform palnned to abolish advertising in all time 
slots of France Télévisions by the end of 2011. 
Also the Spanish government decided to follow the German and French examples 
announcing a drastic reduction in advertising on public TV (RTVE) on April 14, 2009 
and on May 8 proposing the complete ban of advertising. The law banning ads from 
public TV on all time slots was approved by the Spanish parliament on July 29 of 2009. 
This law came into effect as of September 1, 2009 but allowed Spanish public TV to 
broadcast until the end of 2009 the advertising contracted before this date. As from the 
first of January of 2010, advertising is banned, except for self-promotion advertising, 
corporate communications campaigns and informational campaigns with social 
purposes. Moreover, RTVE is not allowed to charge for these exceptional ads. To 
finance its operations, the public corporation would continue receiving state subsidies, 
in addition to proceeds from new specific taxes to private television stations and 
telecommunications companies, and an important percentage of the revenues from the 
fee on airwaves usage.  
The modalities of the gradual phase out of advertising on France Télévisions are laid 
out in the new law on the reform of French public television adopted in March 2009.
16
 
From a strictly arithmetical viewpoint and considering only the daily average duration 
of advertising interruptions, private stations (TF1 and M6) could take up completely the 
advertisers’ demand in the 20pm-6am time slot, because of the increase of advertising 
time from 6 to 9 minutes per hour mentioned above
17
. However, taking into account the 
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 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/fr/oj/2007/l_332/l_33220071218fr00270045.pdf 
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 European Commission, 2008. 
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 SNPTV, 2010. 
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 Ministère de la culture et de la communication, 2009 and Journal Officiel de la République Française, 
2009. 
17
 Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel, 2009. 
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advertising time across different slots, the slots 12am-14pm and 19pm-22pm show that 
the advertising time on private stations was close to the maximum allowed (12 minutes), 
because of the consumption habits of French viewers.
18
 
These informal observations can be combined with theoretical predictions based on 
previous analytical work on the theme. This will be done in Section 3, while the next 
section briefly reviews those studies that deal with advertising caps in media markets. 
Section 4 describes the data while Section 5 shows the results of the empirical analysis. 
Section 6 concludes discussing the policy implications of our main results. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
Following the seminal works of Steiner (1952), Corden (1953) and Reddaway (1963), 
quite a rich theoretical literature developed on the media markets, e.g. Spence and Owen 
(1977) and Beebe (1977). These studies have in the recent years merged into the wider 
literature on two-sided markets, as first defined by Parker & Van Alstyne (2002), 
Rochet & Tirole (2003, 2006) and Armstrong (2006). As discussed in detail in 
Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005), in a two-sided market a media firm typically sells 
content to readers/viewers/listeners and advertising space to advertisers and it knows 
that the number (and possibly the characteristics) of viewers/readers/listeners influences 
the demand for advertising space/time while, on the other hand, the quantity (or 
concentration) of advertising slots affects the demand from readers/viewers/listeners. In 
other words, a media firm recognises and internalizes the existence of indirect network 
effects between the two-sides of the market as it knows that in such a market the viable 
business strategy requires bringing “both sides on board”. Whereas clearly the higher 
the number of readers/listeners/viewers the higher the demand for ads all else equal, 
vice versa it is not clearly established what is the attitude of readers/listeners/viewers 
towards advertising. 
Most advanced countries regulate the maximum amount (e.g., minutes per hour of 
programming) of TV advertising, In addition, policy makers believe that some (de)merit 
goods must not be advertised and paternalistic considerations suggest advertising bans 
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on specific products. Rather surprisingly, economic scholars focused the second point, 
while the economic analysis on advertising ceilings is extremely thin
19
.  
Anderson (2007) uses a two-sided market model to investigate the effects of advertising 
caps on social welfare. The disutility that consumers as readers or viewers derive from 
advertising may be particularly high with respect to the benefits accruing to advertisers. 
With high ad aversion the level of advertising in equilibrium may be excessive with 
respect to the social optimum. The opposite circumstance of over provision of 
advertising takes place if the advertising nuisance for consumers is lower than the return 
for advertisers. Therefore, an advertising cap is socially beneficial in the first case and 
harmful in the second. Anderson (2007) studies the advertising choice of a monopolist 
platform. With low advertising nuisance, the monopolist determines a level of 
advertising which is below the optimal level. Under this circumstance, the effect of an 
advertising cap is a further reduction of social welfare. If we consider the opposite 
scenario with high advertising nuisance, the level of advertising is over the social 
optimum. This means that an advertising cap will increase social welfare. However, the 
monopolist profits will fall as well, and this may reduce the incentives for other firms to 
enter the market and increase the variety of programming.  
Although these results are quite reasonable, they assume to a monopolist platform/editor. 
In case of more than one firm in the market, strategic considerations play a major role in 
shaping the equilibrium outcome. In addition, the equilibrium changes according the 
assumptions on viewers’ behaviour, profit functions of media outlets and advertising 
demand function. Anderson (2007) also studies the effects of advertising caps on the 
quality of programming and on the degree of diversity between competing platforms. 
The results in terms of content quality and variety are mixed. 
In Australia television advertising was deregulated in September 1987 (with the aim of 
reducing the rate of interruption to programs) by allowing stations more flexibility in 
their scheduling of ad time. Wright (1994) claims that deregulation caused an increase 
in the amount of non-program content and puts forward a duopoly model where 
commercial TV stations compete. Wright (1994) shows that the regulation of the 
number of advertisements per unit of time both below the joint profit maximizing level 
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 A correct and complete evaluation of the effects of advertising caps on producers, consumers and 
media should include a broad discussion about the role of advertising in modern economies. See 
Anderson (2007). 
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(for appropriate parameters) and below the Nash equilibrium level (for different 
appropriate parameters) can reduce program quality. Therefore, depending on the 
parameters of the model, fostering competition may be preferable to regulating the 
amount of advertisements per unit of time. 
Finally, Stuhmeier and Wenzel (2012) analyse the effects of advertising bans. The main 
assumptions of their theoretical model are the following: two TV channels, horizontal 
program differentiation, a continuum of TV viewers. They assume a continuum of 
advertisers with measure 1, with a utility function given by 
)2(
2
1
)( 21
2
2
2
121 abaaaaaAU   
where A is the size of the advertising market and ai is the demand of advertising on 
channel i. This assumption leads to an indirect demand of advertising given by 
jii baaAp   
where pi is the price of an advertising unit and b measures the differentiation of the 
channels in the eyes of the advertisers. Stuhmeier and Wenzel (2012) stress that this 
approach allows for a correct description of “pecuniary externalities”, that is, the effect 
on the advertising price caused by the advertising decisions of each media outlet
20
. The 
main objective of Stuhmeier and Wenzel (2012) is to explore the effect of an 
asymmetric advertising cap, that is, un upper bound imposed only to the advertising 
time of a single broadcaster. The model of Stuhmeier and Wenzel (2012) predicts that 
an advertising cap will have the following effects: i) the unregulated channel will 
increase its advertising level if advertising is a strategic substitute and decreases its 
advertising level if advertising is a strategic complement; ii) strengthening the cap will 
make the price of advertising rise on both TV channels; iii) after the introduction of the 
advertising cap, the unregulated TV station gain higher profits if the degree of 
differentiation in the eye of advertisers is over a given level; otherwise, the profits of the 
unregulated private channel decrease; iv) for moderate levels of regulation, the profit of 
the regulated channel may increase after the introduction of advertising caps. 
Bourreau and Grece (2011) consider the French advertising ban explicitly and put 
forward a mixed oligopoly model. A private TV channel is financed only by 
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 However, the utility of advertisers is not affected by the number or characteristics of each channel’s 
viewers; in other words, they abstract from indirect network effects that typically characterize two sided 
markets. 
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advertising, while the public channel derives its revenues from advertising and public 
support. The public TV maximizes the viewers’ surplus under a budget constraint. Both 
channels choose the investment in program quality and select the advertising intensity. 
With advertising revenues, the program quality and the audience of public TV are 
higher than its’ private competitor, while advertising intensity is not necessarily lower. 
Introducing an advertising cap on public programs lessens the incentives to invest in 
quality; at the same time, the cap reduces the degree of competition on advertising 
intensity. If the advertising cap is more binding, both channels reduce program quality 
and advertising intensity, while the audience and profits of the private channel tend to 
fall. Therefore, the adoption of an advertising cap for the public TV does not necessarily 
benefit the private channel.  
 
3. Theoretical background 
 
Although this paper deals with two-sided markets, the theoretical and empirical analysis 
will focus on the advertising side. In fact, broadcasting televisions derive the bulk of 
their revenues from selling advertising time, given the nature of public good of TV 
programs on the viewers’ side21. We first formalize a theoretical argument in general 
terms, then we apply the very same argument to the total suppression of advertising on a 
single TV station. In particular, we study the effects produced by a change of the level 
of advertising of a single TV station. To do so, the rest of the section assumes a duopoly 
market, with a public station competing with a private station. In particular, we assume 
that public TV reduces its level of advertising because of an advertising cap; in other 
words, we have a “regulated” public station competing with an “unregulated” private 
station. The reduction of advertising of the public TV station may produce diverging 
effects. 
1) The first effect derives from cross network externalities. If viewers are adverse 
to advertising, the audience of the public station raises and, ceteris paribus, the 
audience of the private station decreases
22
. This effect increases the demand for 
advertising of the public station as well as the the price of ad slots on public TV. 
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 In many countries a possession fee is levied to finance the TV channels controlled by the State. 
22
 Most contributions of media economics, for example Mangani (2003), Crampes et al. (2004), 
Gabszewicz et al. (2004), Kohlschein (2004), Anderson (2005), Anderson and Coate (2005), Ambrus and 
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2) The second effect is occasionally called “pecuniary externalities” (Reisinger et 
al., 2009) and goes in the opposite direction, at least partially: the reduction of 
advertising on the public station determines a reduction of total supply of 
advertising. If we assume an inverse demand function for advertising taking the 
form of pA=f(W) with f’<0, where pA is the price per viewer-time and W is the 
total supply of viewers-time units, the price of advertising will increase after an 
advertising ban.
23
 
The pecuniary externalities argument presents two crucial points. First, the price of 
advertising needs to be unique. This contrasts with the causal observations of frequent 
price differentiation in the advertising market. Second, the economic rationale of 
pecuniary externalities may not hold when a TV station decreases its advertising level. 
Here, the competitor has no interest in stabilizing the increasing advertising price.  
Broadly speaking, the reduction of advertising quantity determines ambiguous effects 
on the price of advertising. These effects depend on the structure of the market (namely, 
the number of broadcasting firms), the degree of product differentiation across media 
outlets (Reisinger et al., 2009), etc.  
The relative importance of network and/or pecuniary effects shapes the definition of 
advertising levels as strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Since advertising is 
an implicit price for viewers, the levels of advertising can be seen as strategic 
complements: when a TV station increases the advertising quantity, the other does the 
same, and the other way round. However, if we consider pecuniary externalities, the 
picture is more complex. In fact, when a (public) TV station increases the level of 
advertising, the price of advertising decreases. As a reaction, the competitor has an 
incentive to reduce its level of advertising to stabilize the price; from this perspective, 
the advertising levels may be seen as strategic substitutes. 
                                                                                                                                               
Reisinger (2005), Choi (2006), Kremhelmer and Zenger (2008), Peitz and Valetti (2008), Kind et al. 
(2009) assume that consumers dislike advertising. Exceptions are Hackner and Nyberg (2000), who 
assume that readers like advertising in print media, and Sonnac (2000), who considers feedbacks from 
advertising to circulation under the two alternative assumptions of consumer advertising aversion and 
advertising appreciation. Also Armstrong (2005), considers alternative scenarios, characterized by 
aversion, love or indifference towards advertising.  
23
 Among the “modern” studies on media markets, only Reisinger et al (2009) and Stuhmeier and Wenzel 
(2010) treat explicitly the pecuniary externalities. In reality, Masson et al. (1990) analyzed the direct 
effect of “advertising supply” on price and, at the same time, showed the importance of advertising 
aversion and network externalities for the market equilibrium. 
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The decision to ban advertising completely in a given time slot is an extreme case of 
this theoretical framework. In fact, when a broadcaster eliminates advertising in a given 
time slot it substantially exits the market, because the “effective” market of 
broadcasting television is on the side of advertisers. The competitor becomes a 
monopolist on the advertisers’ side, although it may finds itself without a relevant 
audience that has shift to the station without advertising. Potentially, this circumstance 
creates a large inefficiency. The market outcome is therefore ambiguous. For example, 
if the degree of program differentiation is relatively large with respect to advertising 
aversion, the absence of advertising on a single TV station will not shift the audience 
from its competitor. If the pecuniary effect prevails upon the cross network effects, the 
private/monopolist/unregulated broadcaster keeps positive levels of advertising and 
increase its revenues. Conversely, if advertising aversion prevails upon program 
differentiation, viewers may abandon the private and unregulated TV channel which, 
although monopolist on the advertisers’ side, cannot exploit its market power. 
Advertising aversion of TV viewers and product differentiation between media outlets 
are difficult to estimate directly. Therefore, the empirical analysis regarding the French 
experience has the objective to explore the consequences of the ban in the advertising 
and audience market. 
 
4. Data 
 
The dataset contains data on quantity of advertising (number of spots and seconds) and 
advertising revenues per channel (aerial, satellite, cable and terrestrial digital) for each 
week in the seasons 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 (excluding the summer months, i.e. July 
and August)
24
. We are therefore able to calculate the average price per spot and price 
per second, in addition to the length of a spot. As already mentioned, starting from the 
6
th
 of January 2009, advertising was banned on public aerial television (“hertziennes 
channels”) in the time period 20.00-6.00, which includes prime-time. We have data for 
both the time-slot 6.00-20.00 and the time-slot 20.00-6.00. In addition, in the season 
2008-2009. we  have data both before and after the ban  
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 The data were obtained from TNS France, now KantarMedia-France. 
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Figure 1 reports summary statistics. Note that we have data on 42 weeks for 2 time slots 
during the day for 2 seasons for 91 channels, which implies a maximum number of 
observations equal to 15288.  
 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Standard 
deviaton  
revenues   14165  807027.6  3574208  
spots  14165 515.6939 522.1669  
seconds  14165  10791.83  10608.26  
night 
time  
15288  0.5054945  0.4999862  
bann  15288  0.297619  0.457226 
 
In addition for the same time periods we have also data on shares of audience over the 
whole day for the aerial channels and for the whole of the non-aerial channels (cable, 
satellite and terrestrial digital). These data were obtained from the weekly press releases 
of Mediametrie. 
Finally, we also have data on the number of viewers in the night time-slot for the aerial 
channels and for the whole of the non-aerial channels.  These data were instead acquired 
from Eurodata TV, that sells the on behalf of Mediametrie. 
Given the audience data do not distinguish between the different non-aerial channels, 
for the analysis that follows we group all the non-aerial channels together. We thus 
consider data from the following channels: a) Private aerial (TF1, M6 and CanalPlus) 2) 
Public aerial (France2, France 3 and Canal 5
25
) c) Non aerial-channels. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis  
                                                 
25
 This includes France 5 and Arte. 
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We use a difference in difference approach and compare for each aerial channel and for 
each week between September and June the season 2008-2009 (the treated group, in 
which the ban was introduced) and the season to the season 2007-2008 (the control 
group, in which there was no ban) and check whether the difference between the two 
changed in the weeks after the ban (the follow-up period) compared to the weeks before 
the ban (the pre-treatment period). 
 
We compare separately the slots 20.00-6.00 and 6.00-20.00 because we cannot rule out 
a priori that there is substitution between the two slots. 
 
Given that the market is two-sided, we look at each side of the market, first separately, 
then jointly. 
 
5.1 The advertising market 
 
Advertising quantity 
 
As shown in Figure 1, advertising quantity on public TV dropped almost to zero in the 
slot 20.00-6.00 after the introduction of the ban, the reason for the remaining 
advertising being that advertising campaigns on social issues were still allowed (and 
paid for).  Figure 2 shows instead that advertising quantity on private TV channels in 
the slot 20.00-6.00 did not change significantly. Indeed, as shown in the second column 
of Table 2, a difference in difference approach estimates a non-significant decline in the 
difference between the 2008-2009 season and the 2007-2008 season. Column seven to 
nine give the details for the three private channels: TF1, M6 and CanalPlus. Figure 3 
shows instead that advertising quantity on public TV channels in the slot 6.00-20.00 
increased substantially. Column three to six show the difference across the three public 
channels: France 2, France 3 and Canal5. Indeed, as shown in the first column Table 3, 
a difference in difference approach estimates a significant increase in the difference 
between the 2008-2009 season and the 2007-2008 season. With regard instead to 
advertising on private TV channels in the time slot 6.00-20.00, Figure 4 shows an initial 
decline after the ban followed by an increase. Overall, as shown in the second column  
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Figure2
Ad Seconds Private 20.00-6.00
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Figure 3 
Ad Seconds Public 6.00-20.00
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Figure 4 
Ad Private Seconds 6.00-20.00
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Table 2 
advertising seconds night-slot 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES public_night private_night aerial_night France2_night France3_night Canal5_night TF1_night M6_night CanalPlus_night Others_night 
           
bann -627.4*** -24.00 -325.7*** -986.4*** -894.8*** -1.155 -119.7 45.18 2.549 -11,685*** 
 (74.26) (51.23) (58.88) (65.69) (46.87) (1.499) (111.6) (102.0) (17.16) (1,688) 
Constant -56.33 95.64** 19.65 -131.0** -39.45 1.412 226.8** 5.059 55.03*** 11,031*** 
 (57.29) (39.52) (45.43) (50.68) (36.16) (1.157) (86.10) (78.69) (13.24) (1,303) 
           
Observations 126 126 252 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.365 0.002 0.109 0.849 0.901 0.015 0.028 0.005 0.001 0.545 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3 
advertising seconds day-slot 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES public_day private_day aerial_day France2_day France3_day Canal5_day TF1_day M6_day CanalPlus_day Others_day 
           
bann 560.8*** -134.9 212.9*** 637.1*** 377.0*** 668.1*** -329.0 -149.2 73.61 -26,041*** 
 (75.99) (110.0) (70.26) (127.5) (105.4) (98.31) (201.4) (209.2) (45.57) (3,354) 
Constant -445.0*** -101.5 -273.2*** -197.3* -383.2*** -754.5*** -12.80 -419.2** 127.5*** 20,418*** 
 (58.63) (84.85) (54.20) (98.33) (81.32) (75.85) (155.4) (161.4) (35.16) (2,588) 
           
Observations 126 126 252 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.305 0.012 0.035 0.385 0.242 0.536 0.063 0.013 0.061 0.601 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4 
advertising seconds whole day 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES public private Aerial France2 France3 Canal5 TF1 M6 CanalPlus Others 
           
bann -66.69 -158.9 -112.8 -349.3* -517.8*** 667.0*** -448.7 -104.0 76.16 -37,727*** 
 (98.56) (150.0) (93.83) (180.7) (142.2) (98.06) (299.9) (293.7) (58.73) (4,945) 
Constant -501.3*** -5.894 -253.6*** -328.2** -422.6*** -753.0*** 214.0 -414.2* 182.5*** 31,449*** 
 (76.04) (115.7) (72.39) (139.4) (109.7) (75.65) (231.4) (226.6) (45.31) (3,815) 
           
Observations 126 126 252 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.085 0.249 0.536 0.053 0.003 0.040 0.593 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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of Table 3, a difference in difference approach estimates an insignificant decline in the 
difference between the 2008-2009 season and the 2007-2008 season. As shown in 
columns seven to nine there is not difference to this regard across private TV stations. 
Finally, as shown in the first and second column of Table 4, when taking into 
consideration the whole day, an insignificant decline in advertising quantity is estimated 
for both public and private TV channels.   
 
Having established that advertising quantity did not shift to private TV in the slot 20.00-
6.00 nor in the slot 6.00-20.00 but rather partly shifted to public TV in the slot which 
was not subject to the ban, we now check whether this is due to an increase in the price 
of advertising on private TV. 
 
Advertising prices 
 
Figure 6 shows that advertising price per second in the time slot 20.00-6.00 on private 
TV channels dropped after the ban. Indeed, as shown in the second column of Table 6, a 
difference in difference approach estimates a decline, albeit insignificant, in the 
difference between the 2008-2009 season and the 2007-2008 season.  From column 
seven and eight the channels TF1 and M6 seem however to have significantly dropped 
their price. Figure 7 shows instead that advertising price per second in the time slot 
20.00-6.00 on private TV channels did not change substantially after the ban. Indeed, as 
shown in the second column of Table 8, a difference in difference approach estimates an 
insignificant increase in the difference between the 2008-2009 season and the 2007-
2008 season. Column seven shows however that the price of advertising on TF1 
significantly increased. 
From the first columns of Table 5 and 6 one can see that the price of advertising on 
public TV channels increased not only during the day but, for the remaining advertising, 
also during the night. Columns four to six show that the increase in prices was 
significant for each of the three public channels. 
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Figure 6 
 
Figure 7 
Price per Second Private 6.00-20.00
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Having established that advertising prices per second dropped on private TV channels 
in the slot 20.00-6.00 and did not change in the slot 6.00-20.00 while ad prices on 
public TV in the slot 6.00-20.00 might even have risen, the consequences for 
advertising revenues are easily derived. 
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Table 5 
price per second night-slot 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES public_night private_night aerial_night France2 France3 TF1 M6 CanalPlus Others 
          
bann 90.06*** -25.17 20.73 86.89* 93.24** -148.0*** 76.46*** -3.934 3.456*** 
 (30.32) (24.59) (19.50) (47.94) (35.71) (37.80) (27.80) (12.27) (0.354) 
Constant -160.3*** -64.84*** -103.0*** -189.0*** -131.6*** -97.41*** -137.7*** 40.63*** 3.906*** 
 (23.20) (18.97) (14.99) (36.68) (27.32) (29.17) (21.45) (9.468) (0.273) 
          
Observations 82 126 208 41 41 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.099 0.008 0.005 0.078 0.149 0.277 0.159 0.003 0.705 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6 
price per second day-slot 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES public_day private_day aerial_day France2 France3 Canal5 TF1 M6 CanalPlus Others 
           
bann 70.32*** 10.38 40.35*** 94.49*** 90.10*** 26.37*** 54.47*** -24.71 1.384 3.749*** 
 (4.723) (12.49) (7.056) (7.734) (5.513) (2.069) (14.14) (18.11) (7.270) (0.225) 
Constant -69.34*** -11.91 -40.63*** -96.91*** -82.50*** -28.60*** -107.7*** 56.86*** 15.13** 1.211*** 
 (3.644) (9.637) (5.444) (5.967) (4.253) (1.596) (10.91) (13.97) (5.609) (0.174) 
           
Observations 126 126 252 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.641 0.006 0.116 0.789 0.870 0.802 0.271 0.044 0.001 0.874 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 7 
price per second whole day 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES public Private aerial France2 France3 Canal5 TF1 M6 CanalPlus Others 
           
bann 46.00*** 0.206 23.10*** 48.03*** 63.59*** 26.38*** -8.611 13.32 -4.093 3.712*** 
 (7.712) (12.13) (7.661) (10.45) (7.097) (2.098) (18.66) (14.98) (7.307) (0.239) 
Constant -82.63*** -19.39** -51.01*** -126.2*** -93.13*** -28.61*** -82.42*** 0.413 23.84*** 2.046*** 
 (5.950) (9.355) (5.910) (8.059) (5.475) (1.619) (14.40) (11.56) (5.637) (0.185) 
           
Observations 126 126 252 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.223 0.000 0.035 0.346 0.667 0.798 0.005 0.019 0.008 0.857 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Advertising revenues 
 
Figure 7 and the second column in Table 8 shows that advertising revenues in the time 
slot 20.00-6.00 for private TV channels dropped significantly after the ban. Interestingly 
from column seven and eight it appears that while TF1 lost substantial advertising 
revenues, M6 instead increased its advertising revenues, albeit not enough to offset the 
loss of TF1. Figure 8 sand the second column of Table 9 show instead that advertising 
revenues in the time slot 20.00-6.00 on private TV channels only insignificantly 
declined after the ban. Interestingly, as shown in column 8 of Table 9 advertising 
revenues on M6 significantly declined.  
From the first columns of Table 9 and 10 one can see that advertising revenues on 
public TV channels increased after the ban in the slot 6.00-20.00, enough to more than 
offset the loss in advertising revenues in the slot 20.00-6.00. Columns four to six show 
that the increase advertising revenues was significant for each of the three public 
channels. 
Figures 11 and 12 together with the tenth columns of Tables 8 and 9 suggest that, while 
advertising on digital television continued to grow, its growth in the slot 20.00-6.00 was 
not affected by the ban coming into effect on January 6th. Similarly, advertising does 
not seem to have switched to cable and satellite.  
 
All this seems to suggest that advertising which was previously broadcasted on public 
TV in the time slot 20.00-6.00 did not switch to private channels in the same time slot 
(nor was the price in that time slot on private channels increased). Rather advertising 
switched to public TV in the time slot 6.00-20.00.   
 
All in all, the evidence shown so far is already sufficient to establish that the common 
expectation that the ban would favor private TV channels at the expense of public ones 
was not fulfilled. 
26
 
 
In the next section we turn to the other side of the market, the audience side, to look for 
an explanation for this surprising finding. 
                                                 
26
 Incidentally, if the claims in the press reported in the introduction were true, this surprising findings 
might explain why the plan to extend the ban to the whole day was indefinitely postponed. 
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Figure 7 
Ad Revenues Private 20.00-6.00
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Figure 9 
Ad Revenues Public 20.00-6.00
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Figure 8 
Ad Revenues Private 6.00-20.00
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Figure 10 
Ad Revenues Public 6.00-20.00
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Table 8 
advertising revenues night-slot 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES public Private Aerial France2 France3 Canal5 TF1 M6 CanalPlus Others 
           
bann -91,004** -137,723* -114,363*** -174,103*** -98,894*** -14.37** -631,680*** 219,173*** -661.6 -49,619 
 (37,195) (71,592) (40,835) (41,102) (21,745) (6.967) (168,438) (74,869) (7,474) (39,289) 
Constant -169,954*** -31,191 -100,573*** -342,381*** -167,511*** 29.02*** 188,522 -327,106*** 45,011*** 548,079*** 
 (28,696) (55,234) (31,505) (31,711) (16,777) (5.375) (129,953) (57,763) (5,766) (30,312) 
           
Observations 126 126 252 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.046 0.029 0.030 0.310 0.341 0.096 0.260 0.176 0.000 0.038 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 9 
advertising revenues day-slot 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES public Private Aerial France2 France3 Canal5 TF1 M6 CanalPlus Others 
           
bann 296,254*** -22,062 137,096*** 445,874*** 341,314*** 101,575*** 109,829 -185,561*** 9,545 125,986** 
 (21,238) (69,709) (38,003) (39,969) (25,169) (8,284) (117,061) (60,128) (10,716) (57,501) 
Constant -272,337*** -161,842*** -217,090*** -383,801*** -323,305*** -109,906*** -653,201*** 119,820** 47,855*** 549,956*** 
 (16,386) (53,782) (29,320) (30,837) (19,418) (6,391) (90,314) (46,390) (8,267) (44,363) 
           
Observations 126 126 252 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.611 0.001 0.049 0.757 0.821 0.790 0.022 0.192 0.019 0.107 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 10 
advertising revenues whole day 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES public private aerial France2 France3 Canal5 TF1 M6 CanalPlus Others 
           
bann 205,251*** -159,786 22,733 271,771*** 242,420*** 101,561*** -521,852* 33,612 8,883 76,367 
 (48,060) (115,532) (63,408) (73,532) (41,511) (8,282) (264,160) (89,362) (16,641) (92,651) 
Constant -442,292*** -193,033** -317,662*** -726,182*** -490,816*** -109,877*** -464,679** -207,286*** 92,866*** 1.098e+06*** 
 (37,079) (89,135) (48,920) (56,731) (32,026) (6,389) (203,804) (68,944) (12,839) (71,482) 
           
Observations 126 126 252 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.128 0.015 0.001 0.255 0.460 0.790 0.089 0.004 0.007 0.017 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 11 
Ad Revenues Digital + Cable & Satellite 20.00-6.00
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Figure 13 
Ad Revenues 20.00-6.00
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Figure 12 
Ad Revenues Digital + Cable & Satellite 6.00-20.00
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Figure 14 
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Ad Revenues 6.00-20.00
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Figure 15 
Ad Revenues
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5.2 The audience market 
 
The fact that advertising which was previously broadcasted on public TV in the time 
slot 20.00-6.00 did not switch to private channels in the same time slot (nor was the 
price in that time slot on private channels increased) may be due to the two-sided nature 
of the market.   
It might be the case for instance that viewers dislike advertising
27
 and that, as 
advertising disappeared from public TV, programs became more attractive, viewers 
switched from private TV to public TV and private TV got less attractive for advertisers. 
Hence private TV channels would have lost revenues because it lost audience.  
 
Also the fact  that advertising switched to public TV in the time slot 6.00-20.00 has a 
two-sided market explanation. It might be the case that from the point of view of 
advertisers viewers are more differentiated between public and private channels than 
they are across time slots: a person watching public TV in the 6.00-20.00 time slot is a 
better substitute for one who watches public TV in the time slot 20-00-6.00 than one 
who watches TV on a private channel. An extreme case of this would be if viewers 
single-homed (i.e. watched just one channel or, at least, type of channel). Then TV 
                                                 
27
 See Wilbur(2008) 
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channels would be monopolists over access to these viewers. Once advertisers cannot 
reach the viewers of public TV on the (type of) channel they watch, they stop 
advertising
28
. If so, private TV channels would have lost revenues because advertisers 
preferred to change the time of their ad rather than the TV channel.   
 
Clearly, only an analysis of the audience market can establish whether one or both of 
the above explanations may be true. 
 
Also, since the empirical evidence above showed that it was not the case that 
advertising switched from public TV to non-aerial TV as a consequence of the ban, then 
would seem justified to focus our attention on the competition between public and 
private aerial TV channels when approaching the audience side of the two-sided market 
 
We start by analyzing the effect of the ban on the shares of audience (with respect to all 
TV viewers) in a day. 
 
The audience of free-to-air channels appears to have been declining, while that of cable, 
satellite and digital TV channels has been increasing. This is shown in Figure 18 which 
reports the audience share of aerial TV over all TV audiences.  
 
Figure 16 
 
 
                                                 
28
 See Armstrong(2006). 
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Consistently, the price per second per audience percentage point has been declining on 
average on aerial (public and private) channels, while it has been increasing on other 
channels (cable, digital and satellite). This can be seen in Figures 17 and 18. 
 
Figure 17 
 
Figure 18 
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The decline in the share of audience of aerial channels is due to a decline in audience 
shares of both private and public channels, as shown respectively on Figure 19 and 
Figure 20. 
Figure 19 
 
 
Figure 20 
 
 
However, our difference in difference estimates show that declining trend has slowed 
down for private TV channels after the ban. The first and second columns of Table 11 
respectively show that the share of audience of public TV channels has insignificantly 
declined, while the share of audience of private TV channels has significantly increased. 
 28 
Consistently, Figure 21 shows that surprisingly audience share of public TV appears to 
have dropped with respect to that of private TV.  
Figure 21 
 
This finding is surprising. The share of audience is a measure of intensity of use of an 
average. If viwers dislike advertising one would expect them to watch private Tv less 
and public Tv more following the disappearance of ads from public Tv. We do not have 
the share of audience for the slot 20.00-6.00 only. Hence, we do not know whether the 
decline in the audience share of public Tv channels over the whole day is due to the 
increase  in advertising in the slot 6.00 to 20.00 and a corresponding decline in the 
audience share in that slot. This may be possible if intensity of use and number of 
viewers are correlated. Indeed, in the slot 20.00-6.00 the number of viewers appears to 
have declined insignificantly on public TV and increased insignificantly on private TV, 
as shown in the first two columns of Table 12. Still we do not have information on the 
number of viewers in the slot 6.00-20.00. And it would be surprising if viewers did not 
switch from public to private TV when advertising on public TV disappeared in the 
night-slot but did switch away from public TV when public TV increased its advertising 
in the day-slot. Unless viewers of private TV channels were much less advertising 
averse than viewers of public channels. Once again it would seem that, as the second 
explanation for the surprising findings on the advertising market postulates, viewers 
heterogeneity may play a role.  
 
All in all, however, we find no evidence of viewers switching to public TV as a result of 
the ban. Hence, this cannot be the reason behind the loss in revenues of private TV 
channels. We are thus left with the possibility that for advertisers differentiation 
between channels in stronger than differentiation across time slots. Preliminary 
evidence shows that this might be the case, in that for instance private TV channels have 
in both time slots a younger audience than public TV stations 
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5.3 Bringing together the two-sides of the market 
 
Having analysed the advertising and the audience side of the market separately, we now 
turn to the interaction between the two sides. We thus calculate the price per advertising 
second per audience percentage point over the whole day and the price per advertising 
second per viewer in the night-slot. Columns 1 in Tables 13 and 14 show that indeed 
both prices have increased on public TV. 
 
It is also possible to calculate the relative price per second per audience percentage 
point on public TV with respect to private TV, by simply multiplying the ratio of prices 
per second with the reciprocal of the ratio of the audience shares. Figure 22 shows that 
indeed the price per second per viewer has declined on private TV with respect to public 
TV.  
 
These findings are not surprising given the previous finding on prices per seconds, 
audience shares and number of viewers. 
 
Figure 22 
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Table 11 
percentage share of audience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES public private aerial France2 France3 Canal5 TF1 M6 CanalPlus Others 
           
bann -0.00206 0.00789*** 0.00291** -0.00101 -0.00480** -0.000358 0.0236*** 0.00162** -0.00156 -0.0175*** 
 (0.00161) (0.00236) (0.00146) (0.00253) (0.00201) (0.00307) (0.00325) (0.000711) (0.00118) (0.00296) 
Constant -0.00690*** -0.0134*** -0.0101*** -0.0106*** -0.00724*** -0.00288 -0.0362*** -0.00582*** 0.00188** 0.0609*** 
 (0.00124) (0.00182) (0.00113) (0.00195) (0.00155) (0.00237) (0.00251) (0.000548) (0.000908) (0.00228) 
           
Observations 126 126 252 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.013 0.082 0.016 0.004 0.125 0.000 0.568 0.115 0.042 0.466 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 12 
number of viewers night-slot 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES public private aerial France2 France3 Canal5 TF1 M6 CanalPlus Others 
           
bann -23.33 27.10 1.884 -28.31 -45.53 3.842 98.00 21.23 -37.92** -340.7*** 
 (18.61) (29.64) (17.54) (35.78) (32.95) (11.55) (60.63) (41.93) (15.37) (31.31) 
Constant -47.92*** -94.23*** -71.08*** -111.6*** -1.076 -31.11*** -242.2*** -88.33*** 47.83*** 511.7*** 
 (14.36) (22.87) (13.53) (27.61) (25.42) (8.911) (46.78) (32.35) (11.86) (24.16) 
           
Observations 126 126 252 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.013 0.007 0.000 0.015 0.046 0.003 0.061 0.006 0.132 0.748 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13 
price per second per audience % point whole-day 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES public private aerial France2 France3 Canal5 TF1 M6 CanalPlus Others 
           
bann 3.303*** -0.678 1.313 2.651*** 4.930*** 2.329*** -3.873*** -0.932 2.771 0.216*** 
 (0.413) (2.486) (1.418) (0.634) (0.551) (0.220) (0.625) (4.624) (4.153) (0.0155) 
Constant -4.971*** 7.464*** 1.247 -6.394*** -6.068*** -2.450*** 2.205*** 18.12*** 2.067 -0.131*** 
 (0.319) (1.918) (1.094) (0.489) (0.425) (0.170) (0.482) (3.567) (3.204) (0.0120) 
           
Observations 126 126 252 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.340 0.001 0.003 0.304 0.667 0.737 0.490 0.001 0.011 0.829 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 14 
price per second per viewer night-slot 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES public private Aerial France2 France3 TF1 M6 CanalPlus Others 
          
bann 0.0763*** 0.0377 0.0535** 0.0571* 0.0956*** -0.0814*** 0.0411* 0.153* 0.00393*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0311) (0.0212) (0.0320) (0.0343) (0.0146) (0.0217) (0.0865) (0.000269) 
Constant -0.109*** -0.0364 -0.0654*** -0.0987*** -0.119*** 0.0227* -0.0544*** -0.0777 -0.00132*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0240) (0.0163) (0.0245) (0.0262) (0.0113) (0.0167) (0.0667) (0.000207) 
          
Observations 82 126 208 41 41 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.119 0.012 0.030 0.076 0.166 0.437 0.083 0.073 0.842 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 32 
7. Conclusions 
 
We have analysed the effects of the advertising ban on French public television, which 
came into effect on the 5th of January 2009 and forbid commercial advertising on public 
TV in the time slot 20.00-6.00.  
 
By using a difference-in-difference approach we show that advertising which was 
previously broadcasted on public TV in the time slot 20.00-6.00 did not switch to 
private channels in the same time slot nor did the price per second or the price per 
second per viewer in that time slot on private channels rise. 
 
Rather advertising partly switched to public TV in the time slot 6.00-20.00, while the 
trend of advertising to move away from aerial towards non-aerial TV channels 
continued, following the relative change in audience, but was not increased by the 
advertising ban, contrary to some claims in the business press at the time. 
 
The ex-ante common expectation that the ban would favour private TV channels at the 
expense of public ones was therefore wrong, as was the ex-post common claim in the 
business press that advertising had switched from aerial TV to digital TV as a result of 
the ban. 
 
Interestingly, the relative audience of public to private TV did not tilt in favour of 
public TV. This suggests that advertising aversion is not the driver of the post-ban 
effects. More likely such a driver is consumers’ heterogeneity. For advertisers, TV 
channels are differentiated not only in the number but also in the type of viewers. It 
would seem that for advertisers viewers of public TV during the day are closer 
substitutes for viewers of public TV in prime time than are viewers of private TV 
channels in prime time. For instance, private TV channels have in both time slots a 
younger audience than public TV stations. 
 
The lesson is that disregarding the two-sided nature of the market may lead to 
unintended consequences of regulatory interventions. 
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